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Tainted Milk: What Kind of Justice for
Victims' Families in China?
By YUNGSUK KAREN YOO*
I. Introduction
The first criminal trials related to China's tainted milk scandal
began in late December 2008. This was a big step forward for the
families of six babies who died and at least 294,000 infants who
suffered health problems from drinking contaminated baby
formula. Hearings were held in the Intermediate People's Court in
Shijiazhuang in the northern province of Hebei, where the now-
bankrupt dairy company at the center of the scandal, Sanlu Group
(Sanlu), is headquartered. On January 22, 2009, two of the
defendants, a dairy producer and a dairy middleman, were
sentenced to death.' The head of Sanlu, a former Communist Party
official, was sentenced to life imprisonment. The defendants were
charged with producing and selling fake or substandard products,
and with crimes against the public safety for producing and selling
melamine to major dairies.2 Melamine is an industrial chemical
commonly used in the manufacture of plastics and fertilizers. It was
added to dilute raw milk to falsely raise protein levels in order to
meet nutrition standards.3 Ingested in large amounts, melamine can
* Yungsuk Karen Yoo is a third-year law student at UC Hastings. She has a
Bachelor of Arts in International Relations from Stanford University and a Master
of Science in Comparative Politics from the London School of Economics. Karen
would like to thank her family, friends, and colleagues at HICLR for their hard
work on the publication.
1. David Barboza, Death Sentences Given in Chinese Milk Scandal, N. Y. TIMES,
Jan, 22, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/22/world/asia/22iht-milk.3.
19601372.html.
2. Six Stand Trial in China's Milk Powder Scandal, XINHUA, Dec. 26, 2008,
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2008-12/26/content_10563494.htm.
3. Lee Glendinning, China Dairy Chief on Trial Over Tainted Milk, Dec. 31, 2008,
THE GUARDIAN, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/dec/31/china-milk-
scandal-trial.
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cause kidney stones and kidney failure.
The Sanlu case presents a vivid illustration of modern Chinese
legal culture and current developments in the rule of law in China.
Since its transition to a market-oriented economy in the 1970s, 4
China's legal system has undergone rapid reform against the
backdrop of exponential economic growth and burgeoning
international trade. Increased domestic litigation is one aspect of
the change in China's legal landscape as litigation becomes a more
socially accepted form of dispute resolution.5 Yet the government
maintains strict control over the courts, wary of cases that implicate
government involvement or responsibility, and especially sensitive
to international scrutiny. In the Sanlu debacle, parents of sick
infants blamed the government for breaching their trust by
certifying melamine-containing products as safe.6 Communist Party
officials were also implicated in covering up the deaths and illnesses
of victims. 7 News of tainted Chinese products spread swiftly to
China's trade partners, who began to recall dairy products imported
from China.8  When the melamine scandal first erupted in
September 2008, Chinese courts repeatedly refused to hear lawsuits
filed on behalf of affected families because the government hoped
that families would quietly accept out-of-court settlements.9 Some
of the lawyers who took on these cases were threatened with
disbarment.10  The December trials signaled the Chinese
4. See, e.g., Stanley Lubman, Bird in a Cage: Chinese Law Reform After Twenty
Years, 20 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 383 (2000).
5. Mary E. Gallagher, Mobilizing the Law in China: 'Informed Disenchantment' and
the Development of Legal Consciousness, 40 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 783, 789 (2006) ("China's
process of dispute resolution for labor conflict has evolved over the reform period
from an almost total reliance on mediation and administrative measures to an
increasing legalization and formalization of the dispute process.").
6. Tainted Milk Execs. On Trial in China, CBS5, Dec. 30, 2009, http://cbs5.com
/national/tainted.milk.china.2.897534.html.
7. Edward Wong, Parents Accept Cash in Tainted Milk Death, N. Y. TIMEs, Jan. 16,
2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/16/world/asia/16iht-milk.2.19429252.
html.
8. Timeline: China Milk Scandal, BBC NEws, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-
pacific/7720404.stm (last visited Jan. 25, 2010).
9. Dissent in China: The Year of Living Dissidently, Jan. 15, 2009, THE ECONOMIST,
http://www.economist.com/world/asia/displaystory.cfm?story_id=12932214;
Barbara Demick, In China, Tainted Milk Trial Kept Under Wraps, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 1,
2009, at A3, available at http:/ /www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-
china-milkl-2009jan01,0,4186405.story.
10. See, e.g., Demick, supra note 9.
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government's response to public frustration and anger, as well as its
reaction to the international pressure and media attention that
threatened to tarnish the reputation of the "Made in China" label."
This note will explore the ways in which the Sanlu case marks a
turning point for dispute resolution in China, from one based on
settlement and mediation to one in which plaintiffs increasingly
seek their day in court. The Sanlu case is also illustrative in that it
tests the outer limits of civil litigation and access of private parties to
Chinese courts, especially when government liability is in question.
China's adoption of its Product Quality Law (PQL) in 1993 and
subsequent amendment in 2000, brought into focus the potential
liability for product manufacturers and sellers under tort law, and
the role of the State in prosecuting producers and sellers of harmful
products under its criminal liability provisions. As China emerges
as a major player in the global economy, the government's role in
regulating product quality and food safety will be increasingly
scrutinized as domestic pressures challenge more traditional forms
of dispute resolution in favor of the courts. Litigation provides an
outlet for plaintiffs to voice their concerns, assert their right to be
heard, and seek greater compensation, while the threat of litigation
incentivizes potential defendants to change their behavior. The
prospect of litigation also shifts the burden onto manufacturers to
self-regulate by holding them accountable for past and present
wrongdoing.
II. Sources of Law Relevant to the Sanlu Case
In China, a civil law system, product liability is entirely statute-
based.' 2 Case law does not generally carry precedential value, and
judicial decisions are rarely published or otherwise made available
to the public.' 3 China's product liability law has been greatly
influenced by the legal experience of developed countries including
the United States, and the Chinese legal system has adopted various
Western legal concepts such as warranties, strict product liability,
11. See Julia A. Phillips, Comment, Does 'Made in China' Translate to 'Watch Out'
for Consumers? The U.S. Congressional Response to Consumer Product Safety Concerns,
27 PENN ST. INT'L L. REV. 217 (2008).
12. Li Han, The Product Quality Law in China: A Proper Balance Between Consumers
and Producers ? 6 J. CHINESE & COMP L. 1 (2003).
13. JIANSHENG LI, LAW ON PRODUCT QUALITY CONTROL AND PRODUCT LIABILITY IN
CHINA 8-9 (2006).
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punitive damages, public hearings and state compensation. 14 While
China does not have an independent statute that addresses product
liability in a comprehensive or systematic way,15 product liability
issues arising in the Sanlu case draw from various sources of
Chinese law, which will be explored below.
A. First Law Related to Food Quality: Food Hygiene Law
The beginning of economic reform and development of a
market economy in China in 1979 led to the adoption of a new legal
framework, which in turn sought to address the proliferation of low
quality goods through regulation. During this period, the Chinese
government promulgated many laws and regulations concerning
product quality and civil law liabilities, including the 1982 Food
Hygiene Law. 16 Section 39 of the Food Hygiene Law provides that a
manufacturer or seller of a food product "who causes food
poisoning or a food-borne bacterial related disease to others, shall
bear responsibility of compensation to a victim." 17 While the law
marked an important step in regulating the quality of food in the
Chinese market, it was a narrow statute that applied only to food
products and did not establish an independent product-related tort
liability.18 The enactment of the General Principles of Civil Law in
1986 addressed such tort liability.
B. General Principles of Civil Law
Arguably the most important legislation related to civil law
liability enacted in China during this period was the 1986 General
Principles of Civil Law (GPCL), China's civil code.19 Section 122 of
the GPCL provides: "Where a substandard product causes property
damage or personal injury to others, the manufacturer or seller shall
bear civil liability according to law." This provision established a
comprehensive product-related tort scheme for the first time in
China.20 It is not clear, however, whether the provision established
a strict liability or an "inferential fault" standard for the
14. Id. at 9.
15. Id. at 13.
16. Id. at 14.
17. Id. at 15.
18. Id.




manufacturer or seller.21 Edward Epstein argues that the primary
purpose of the GPCL was to enforce a system to prevent damage
and injury, not to provide compensation; at the same time the GPCL
is more than just a protective statute creating a duty not to harm a
class of persons, because it "expressly create[s] the constituents and
form of liability." 22 What remained significant, though, was the
broad application of the product liability law to every kind of
product.23
In the context of China's civil law system, the GPCL should be
viewed as a general law that "coordinates" specific types of legal
obligations created by particular laws with regulations relevant to
the subject area in question.24 The GPCL is the legislative source for
China's Product Quality Law (PQL),25 which will be discussed
below.
C. The 1993 Product Quality Law and its Administration
The use of the term "substandard" in section 122 of the GPCL
was highly ambiguous and therefore widely criticized. The PQL,
which replaced the term "substandard" with "defect in product,"
can be seen as the Chinese legislature's response to this ambiguity.2 6
Article 46 of the PQL defines "defect" (quexian) as an unreasonable
defect existing in a product that may endanger the safety of human
life or another person's property. 27 Where there are national or
trade standards safeguarding the health or safety of human life and
property, "defect" means noncompliance with such standards.
Under the PQL, producers and sellers are liable for defective
products when such products cause personal injury or damage to
the property of others.28 The existence of a defect in a product is
thus a necessary element in tortious product liability.
The PQL represents the farthest reaching and most systematic
21. Id. at 16.
22. Edward J. Epstein, Tortious Liability for Defective Products in the People's
Republic of China, 2 J. CHINESE L. 285, 290 (1988).
23. Li, supra note 13, at 16.
24. Epstein, supra note 22, at 294.
25. A. Brooke Overby, Consumer Protection in China After Accession to the WTO,
33 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 347, 357 (2006).
26. Li, supra note 13, at 20.
27. Han, supra note 12.
28. Han, supra note 12; Epstein, supra note 22, at 304.
2010]
Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
regulation of product liability in China to date. It imposes
administrative and criminal penalties, as well as civil liability for
contract and tort violations of quality control requirements as
defined by the law.29 Therefore, its provisions are administrative
and civil in nature.30 Article 4 of the PQL also implicates the liability
of administrative organs by providing that "administrative
departments 'whose control and supervision of quality are slack
shall bear joint and several liability."' 31
Under the PQL and Article 5 of China's Standardization Law,
the General Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection and
Quarantine (AQSIQ) has sole authority to conduct conformity
assessments in order to maintain nationwide supervision and
control over product quality.32 The administration, through random
inspection of producers and sellers, ensures compliance with
prescribed standards.33 The AQSIQ was established in 1955 to set
quality standards and to test and certify domestically traded
products.34 In China, national, local, and industry standards related
to public health are considered compulsory. AQSIQ sets forth
mandatory certification requirements35 and falls under the direct
authority of the State Council, the highest organ of state
administration in China.36
Producers and sellers are potentially liable when an inspection
agency discovers a violation of quality or certification regulations,
either through random inspections, or through customer
complaints.37 At the same time, institutional problems such as
entrenched corruption and weak enforcement capabilities at the
29. Epstein, supra note 22, at 293.
30. Li, supra note 13, at 17.
31. Epstein, supra note 22, at 306.
32. See LAUREN J. SAADAT, THE LAWYER'S GUIDE TO CHINA'S TECHNICAL
REGULATIONS FOR IMPORTED PRODUCTS 21 (2001); Ljiljana Biukovic, Selective
Adaptation of VVO Transparency Norms and Local Practices in China and Japan, Mini
Symposium on Transparency in the WTO, 11 J. INT. ECON. L. 803, 821 (Dec. 2008); see
also General Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine of
PRC, http://english.aqsiq.gov.cn/AboutAQSIQ/Mission (last visited Feb. 21,
2009).
33. SAADAT, supra note 32, at 21.
34. Id. at 15.
35. Biukovic, supra note 32, at 822-23.
36. SAADAT, supra note 32, at 16; Biukovic, supra note 32, at 821.
37. SAADAT, supra note 32, at 21.
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local level result in government oversight.38 Julia Phillips argues
that corruption in China's manufacturing sector is a result of the
sheer number of factories that require policing, preferential
treatment for big businesses by officials who are charged with
monitoring them, and the widespread acceptance of bribes by local
police.39 Furthermore, a complicated chain of production involving
multiple subcontractors, who are often untraceable due to lack of
disclosure rules means that not enough attention is paid at the local
contractor level.40 Because manufacturers are also under pressure
from their trading partners to provide their products quickly and at
a low price, they have an incentive to cut costs, which often means
using ingredients that are less safe.41 In recent years, however,
international media exposure concerning the safety of Chinese
products has forced the Chinese government to crack down on its
quality control problem, or at least appear to do so. 42
D. Consumer Rights Law
The Consumer Rights Law (CRL) broadens the scope of China's
product-related law. It enumerates the basic rights of consumers,
the basic obligations of business operators, and outlines the
administrative liabilities of business operators who violate the law.43
For example, product manufacturers are held liable for any express
warranties on their products as well as implied warranties on the
functionality of their products. The CRL allows consumers to
pursue product liability claims in court, where they may be
compensated for damages incurred as a result of a defective
product.44 Other penalties include the confiscation of goods and
business licenses, as well as fines, and possible criminal
prosecution.45
Under the CRL, the Chinese government is required to assist
administrative agencies in performing their consumer safety duties,
including the fielding of complaints from consumers and public
38. Phillips, supra note 11, at 224.
39. Id. at 225, 235.
40. Id. at 228.
41. Id. at 234.
42. Phillips, supra note 11, at 225.
43. Li, supra note 13, at 23-24.
44. SAADAT, supra note 32, at 26.
45. SAADAT, supra note 32, at 26.
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organizations concerning product quality, and the investigation and
prosecution of those who violate the CRL and other related laws.46
In addition, consumer-based organizations are obligated to monitor
product quality and protect consumer rights by providing support
to victims in legal proceedings and utilizing the media to assert the
rights and interests of consumers.47 Finally, it is worth noting that
neither the CRL nor the PQL requires notification of an unsafe
product to an importing country, even when it is known not to meet
product quality standards.48
The CRL underwent a major overhaul in 2009, which expanded
the coverage of the law to a greater range of products, and allowed
the China Consumers Association, a national consumer rights body,
to represent consumers in courts. 49  This amendment has
implications for enhanced consumer protection in China and
increased access to legal representation for those who may not
otherwise be able to afford it.
E. Criminal Laws and Procedure
Although this note focuses on Chinese civil litigation, a brief
background on the relevant criminal law may be appropriate for a
better understanding of the Sanlu case. The 1997 Revised Criminal
Law punishes unlawful actions of producing or marketing fake or
inferior products, in addition to the crime of endangering the public
security when the action causes serious injury to human life or
property.50 Furthermore, China's Code of Criminal Procedure
allows crime victims who suffer personal injury or damage to
property to bring a civil action in addition to the criminal
prosecution. Victims' families may bring supplementary civil
actions to be heard at the same time as the criminal trial.51
46. Gabriel Allen, Get the Lead Out: A New Approach for Regulating the U.S. Toy
Market in a Globalized World, 36 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 615, 630 (2008).
47. Id. at 630.
48. Id. at 632.
49. Wang Qian, Consumer Watchdog to Get Bite, CHINA DAILY, March 16, 2009,
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2009-03/16/content_7580264.htm.
50. Li, supra note 13, at 26.
51. Epstein, supra note 22, at 316.
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III. Dispute Resolution Mechanisms in China: From
Mediation to Litigation
This section outlines commonly used dispute resolution
mechanisms in contemporary China, focusing on civil cases. The
current trend indicates a shift from mediation and out-of-court
dispute settlements to more formalized procedures including
litigation through the judicial system. However, the shift has been
skewed in favor of politically acceptable resolutions rather than
those dictated by the parties involved.
In broad terms, the Chinese courts represent an extension of the
political system over which the ruling Communist Party (CCP)
maintains a strong grip. Ronald Brown explains that the courts
"may be viewed ... as an administrative organ of the government"
with duties that are interrelated to the other political and
governmental branches. 52 Randall Peerenboom argues that the
courts lack independence due to a system in which the CCP
approves the appointment of senior judges as well as court
presidents, who have ultimate decision-making power.53
Peerenboom notes that while direct party interference is actually
rare, the overwhelming source of outside influence is local
government officials seeking to protect local interests.54 Meanwhile,
CCP committees look over politically sensitive cases before they are
accepted by courts, and those cases that are accepted may be tried in
secret using "internal rules" and without the presence of attorneys.55
Andrea Cheuk further notes that the docketing process governed by
the Civil Procedure Law gives Chinese courts great discretion over
whether or not to accept particular cases, which places another
barrier to entry into the court system for litigants.56 Courts also offer
parties a chance to mediate before accepting cases and before
52. RONALD C. BROWN, UNDERSTANDING CHINESE COURTS AND LEGAL PROCESS:
LAW WITH CHINESE CHARACTERISTICS 4 (1997).
53. RANDALL PEERENBOOM, CHINA'S LONG MARCH TOWARD RULE OF LAW 14
(2002); see also Benjamin L. Liebman, China's Courts: Restricted Reform, 21 COLUM. J.
ASIAN L. 1, 17 (2007).
54. See PEERENBOOM, supra note 53, at 14.
55. See BROWN, supra note 52, at 4; see also DVD: The People's Court: Introducing
the Rule of Law in China (Xanadu Productions Ltd. 2007) (on file with Hastings
Law Library) [hereinafter The People's Court].
56. Andrea Cheuk, The Li'an ("Docketing") Process: Barriers to Initiating Lawsuits
in China and Possible Reforms, 26 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 72, 74 (2008).
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making judgments.57 Settlements agreed to under mediation are
binding agreements and cannot be overturned by courts or
appealed.5 8
A. Mediation
Grassroots dispute settlement, a traditional method of non-
litigation, continues to be a major means of resolving disputes in
China.59 Historically, China has utilized what Laurence Boulle
refers to as "communally-based systems of managing conflict," with
respected local elders acting as mediators in order to resolve
disputes, keep the peace, and enforce social sanctions.60 Localized
dispute resolution mechanisms within villages and cities were
codified under the 1989 Organic Regulations on People's Mediation
Committees and the 1990 Measures for Handling Disputes Among
the People.61 By 1989 over 1 million mediation committees were
established. Mediation is available for minor civil disputes and
minor criminal offenses.62
Mediation, a widely accepted form of dispute resolution in
Chinese society, has been formalized to a certain extent under the
new approaches to litigation and court-enforced arbitration as
highlighted in the Civil Procedure Law.63 When a Chinese court
hears a civil case, it follows the principle of "doing all it can to
mediate first, adjudicating when so doing is proper, and combining
mediation with adjudication to close the case." 64  The Civil
Procedure Law provides that: (a) A people's mediation committee
shall mediate in accordance with the provisions of law and on the
basis of the principle of voluntary participation; (b) The parties shall
carry out the agreements reached upon mediation; and (c) If any
party does not wish to enter into mediation, mediation has failed, or
any party repudiates the mediation agreement, an action may be
57. The People's Court, supra note 55.
58. Id.
59. BROWN, supra note 52, at 22.
60. BEE CHEN GOH, LAW WITHOUT LAWYERS, JUSTICE WITHOUT COURTS: ON
TRADITIONAL CHINESE MEDIATION 3 (2002) (quoting LAURENCE BOULLE & MIRYANA
NESIC, MEDIATION: PRINCIPLES, PROCESS, PRACTICE 32 (1996)).
61. BROWN, supra note 52, at 22-23.
62. Id. at 23.
63. Id. at 22.
64. State Council Information Office, China's Efforts and Achievement in
Promoting the Rule of Law, 7 CHIN. J. INT'L LAW 513, 536 (2008).
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brought in the People's Court.65
Therefore mediation is voluntary in theory, but official state
policy emphasizes mediation as the preferred mode of dispute
resolution.66 Judicial personnel will try to mediate with the parties
to persuade them to reach a compromise. Mediation decisions are
legally enforceable, issued as formal court decisions which the
parties sign.67  Court-enforced mediation has been a highly
successful means of dispute resolution in China. For instance, in
2006, about 56 percent of civil cases of first instance in China were
solved through mediation.68 Court mediation is available in all
areas except administrative litigation. 69
B. Litigation
Litigation, including administrative litigation, has become an
increasingly common means of resolving disputes in China. While
litigation was virtually nonexistent in 1979, the total number of cases
of first instance equaled 3 million by 1992, and 5 million by 1996.70
More recent numbers indicate 8.1 million cases that were heard in
2006.71 While litigation has increased in the past two decades,
mediation has decreased over the same time period.72 Part of this
shift may be attributed to a change in society's attitudes in favor of
more formalized methods of dispute resolution and greater
acceptance of litigation as a legitimate means of addressing and
resolving conflict. Some theorists also argue that the shift towards
litigation can be attributed to a greater assertion of individual rights
in the context of a market economy including the protection of
newly accumulated wealth and a greater willingness to sue among
the Chinese.73 Litigation has thus become more socially acceptable
65. BROWN, supra note 52, at 22.
66. GOH, supra note 60, at 133.
67. Cheuk, supra note 56, at 74 n.95 (citing Zhan Jusheng, Yi qufen su song zhong
de tiao jie yu he jie [Differentiating Between Compromise and Mediation], Fa lu jiao yu
wang [Legal Education Online]), http://www.chinalawedu.com/news/20800/
21690/2006/1/li010618404414216.
68. State Council Information Office, supra note 64.
69. BROWN, supra note 52, at 23.
70. PEERENBOOM, supra note 53, at 7.
71. Liebman, supra note 53, at 4.
72. PEERENBOOM, supra note 53, at 162.
73. See Andrew J. Green, Tort Reform with Chinese Characteristics: Towards a
'Harmonious Society' in the People's Republic of China, 10 SAN DIEGO INT'L L. J. 121, 146
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in a society that has undergone unparalleled transformation in the
past three decades.
Better access to lawyers is another important factor that weighs
in favor of increased litigation in China. The number of lawyers
doubled from 43,000 in 1989, to over 115,000 in 2001. 74 The 1996
Lawyer's Law has transformed the profession from one made up of
public servants supporting a socialist state, to one centered around
the best interests of the client and operation under established rules
of professional conduct.75 Similarly, the 1995 Judge's Law has
spurred judicial reform in China to create a more competent
professional body of judges with better legal knowledge and
training.76 The quality of court opinions has also improved due to a
2005 notice issued by the Supreme People's Court that required
opinions to contain an accurate description of the facts, evidence,
logical arguments and legal reasoning. 77 All of these factors coalesce
to form a new legal environment that prompts ordinary citizens to
use the courts to resolve their disputes. Still, it must be
acknowledged that litigation is most likely regarded as a method of
last resort, or at least as a threatening counterweight to mediation
that induces parties to take mediation seriously.78 Mediation and
litigation may thus be considered two sides of the same coin. While
courts still emphasize mediation as an important means of resolving
conflicts, if mediation fails or one party refuses to comply with the
terms of the settlement, the other party may seek enforcement or
dispute resolution through the courts.79
IV. Dispute Resolution in the Sanlu Case
Returning to the Sanlu case, the various approaches taken by
the parties that brought suit against melamine producers and dairy
companies represent the spectrum of available and unavailable
dispute resolution mechanisms in China. Courts facing difficult or
sensitive cases often respond with inaction.8 0 Courts have long
(2008); see also GOH, supra note 60.
74. Green, supra note 73, at 146.
75. BROWN, supra note 52, at 28.
76. Id. See also Liebman, supra note 53, at 15.
77. Liebman, supra note 53, at 13.
78. PEERENBOOM, supra note 53, at 163.
79. Id.
80. Liebman, supra note 53, at 27.
[Vol. 33:2
Tainted Milk
refused to accept certain classes of disputes related to government
decisions and institutional reform, deferring to the other branches of
government on tough political issues. Nevertheless, the courts have
become a popular forum for airing public grievances including class
actions and public interest litigation.81 Usually, the goal of litigants
in such cases is to generate sufficient media attention and public
pressure to compel official action. Benjamin Liebman notes that
China is "distinct in its extreme reliance on extra-judicial responses
to major public disputes in the courts."82 In this way, litigation, or at
least the act of filing suit, provides a way for plaintiffs to urge some
kind of response from the government, even if it does not come
from the courts. At first glance, the Sanlu case appears to follow this
pattern of using litigation to prompt a non-judicial response to a
major public policy issue.
At the same time, the case fits into the category of politically
sensitive cases that involve litigants with ties to CCP officials and
has attracted much public attention due to the nationwide media
coverage and public health implications. Perhaps due to increased
pressures and international scrutiny caused by the 2008 Olympic
Games, local government officials covered up the deaths and
illnesses of victims for months before the scandal erupted. 83
Although dairy producers were receiving complaints as early as
December 2007, Sanlu allegedly did not take action until its foreign
trade partner Fonterra, a New Zealand dairy firm, notified Beijing in
September 2008.84 Officials then acknowledged that China's major
dairy companies were exempted from government inspections,
signaling a complete collapse of the regulatory system.8 5 As public
anger flared against both dairy producers and government officials
and regulators, the central government realized that it needed to
81. Id. at 34.
82. Id. at 35.
83. See, e.g., Edward Wong More Lawsuits Filed Over Tainted Milk in China, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 30, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/31/world/asia/31milk.
html?fta=y.
84. David Barboza, China Says Complaints About Milk Started in 2007, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 24, 2008, at A8, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/24/world/
asia/24milk.html?scp=2&sq=china %20milk&st=cse.
85. Jim Yardley & David Barboza, Despite Warnings, China's Regulators Failed to
Stop Tainted Milk, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 2008, at Al, available at http://www.nytimes
.com/2008/09/27/world/asia/27ilk.html?pagewanted=2&fta=y.
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take a more proactive stance.86
In the face of mounting public pressure, the initial government
reaction was to play the blame game, firing local city officials in
Shijiazhuang who allegedly delayed notifying Beijing and colluded
with dairy companies in the cover up.87 China's highest-ranking
food quality official, Li Changjiang, resigned. Meanwhile, judges
and lawyers were pressured by officials not to take on milk-related
product liability cases. Courts refused to hear cases brought by
private individual plaintiffs. 88 Frustrated with the lack of justice and
redress through the courts, families of sick children called on the
government for other means of relief. These plaintiffs and their
attorneys arguably recognized early on that courts would not accept
their cases, but wanted to use the threat of litigation to mobilize
public attention and exert greater pressure on the central
government.
A. Out-of-Court Settlements
In a step towards conciliation under heightened public pressure
and media scrutiny, Sanlu and twenty-one other dairy companies
sent letters to parents offering settlements of 200,000 yuan for the
death of a child, 30,000 yuan for children who suffered kidney
stones or acute kidney failure, and 2,000 yuan for less severe cases.89
Around 3,000 families in the city of Shijiazhuang accepted
compensation for their sick children. Furthermore, a fund was set
up to pay for medical treatment of the children until they reach 18
years of age.90 While some parents accepted these payments, others
have complained that the offer does not adequately compensate the
harm their children suffered as a result of the tainted milk. One
group collected two hundred and fifty signatures from victims'
families who demanded long-term health care and medical research
86. China Milk Scandal 'Guilty' Plea, Dec. 31, 2008, BBC NEWS, http://news
.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/7805560.stm.
87. Yardley & Barboza, supra note 85.
88. See Edward Wong, Milk Scandal in China Yields Cash for Parents, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 17, 2009, at A10, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/17/world/
asia/17milk. html?emc=etal.
89. China Couple Gets Payout After Child Killed By Tainted Milk, Jan. 16, 2009,





on their children's illnesses.91
The first to opt for an out-of-court settlement for the death of a
child was a young couple from Gansu province who lost their infant
son in May 2008, accepting a 200,000 yuan (USD 29,250)
compensation from Sanlu and forfeiting any further rights to sue.92
The couple had filed suit in Lanzhou Intermediate People's Court in
Gansu province in October 2008, but the court did not accept the
case.93 In a New York Times interview, the couple's lawyer attested
that the amount of compensation "seems fine" for the parents, who
were from a relatively poor province and did not expect a higher
amount in damages even if the case had gone to court. The baby's
father, Mr. Yi Yongsheng, is quoted as saying: "I don't place too
much hope in a lawsuit. I just want to ask for justice." 94
The range of behavior among the plaintiffs indicates a split
between those who considered the monetary compensation
sufficient, partly because they did not expect more from further suit
or distrusted the justice system, and those who were dissatisfied
with the terms of the settlement and continued to press charges.
The former group appears to rely on what Liebman calls an "extra-
judicial response," 95 accepting payments offered by dairy companies
and thereby losing their rights to sue, while the latter group
diverges from this approach. This latter group sustained their
litigious efforts, bringing various individual civil suits to local
courts, as well as a joint class action lawsuit to the Supreme People's
Court, the highest court in the land.
B. Individual Civil Actions
Hundreds of individual families filed civil suits in the courts
against dairy companies such as Sanlu, as well as retailers who sold
the tainted milk, to seek compensation for the harm to their
children. In late 2009, courts accepted just six of these cases. A
hearing on the first case was held in Beijing on November 28, 2009,
in which a family from Henan province sought $8,000 in
compensation from Sanlu and Longhua, a Beijing-based
91. Wong, supra note 88.
92. CHANNEL NEws ASIA, supra note 89; Wong, supra note 88.
93. Wong, supra note 88.
94. Id.
95. Liebman, supra note 53, at 14.
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supermarket. 96 A second hearing, initially scheduled for December
9, was postponed to allow defendants more time to investigate the
link between the tainted milk and the child's illness.97 The delay
signals an unwillingness and hesitation on the part of Chinese
courts to take on politically sensitive issues without clear guidance
or precedent.
C. Potential Class Action Suit
In January 2009, Chinese lawyers filed a class action product
liability suit in the Supreme People's Court in Beijing on behalf of
the families whose children died or became ill due to tainted milk.
The action sought $5.2 million in damages from twenty-two dairy
companies on behalf of 213 children.98 Some of the plaintiffs
included those who had previously filed class actions in Hebei
Province High Court and Shijiazhuang Intermediate Court and were
rejected. In early March 2009, the Supreme People's Court
announced, contrary to previous policy, that it would accept these
cases.99 However, one lawyer involved in the suit told a reporter
that the Court would only be guiding him to the existing
compensation plan100
Class action lawsuits are extremely rare in China, as the CCP
discourages such suits on grounds that they threaten social stability.
The Chinese Civil Procedure Law contains provisions regarding
"joint lawsuits," but the language is overly broad.101 Article 54
96. Tainted Milk Case in China Court, Nov. 28, 2009, BBC NEws, http://news
.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/8384304.stm; Edward Wong, Civil Suit Hearing Held in
China Milk Scandal, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29, 2009, at A8, available at http://www.
nytimes.com/2009/11/29/world/asia/29china.html.
97. Wang Yan, Compensation Lawsuit Over Tainted Milk Postponed, CHINA DAILY,
Dec. 9, 2009, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/bizchina/2009-12/09/content-
9144184.htm.
98. Debra Cassens Weiss, Two Chinese Dairy Producers Get Death Penalty for
Selling Tainted Milk, ABA JOURNAL, Jan. 22, 2009, http://www.abajournal.com/
news/two chinese dairy producers-get deathpenalty for selling-tainted-milk/
print/; Edward Wong, Families File Suit in Tainted Milk Scandal, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21,
2009 at A19, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/21/world/asia/21
milk.html?_ r=2&ref=asia.
99. Anita Chang, In Switch, China Courts Accept Tainted Milk Suits, ABC NEWS,
Mar. 3, 2009, http://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory?id=6994190.
100. Id.
101. Traci Daffer, 'I Am Fighting For the Right to Eat, and I Will Keep Fighting. The
Truth is on Our Side': Class Action Litigation as a Means of Enacting Social Change in
China, 75 UMKC L. REv. 227, 230 (2006).
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applies when there is a fixed number of litigants; article 55 applies
when the number of litigants is indefinite.102 Furthermore,
questions of subject matter jurisdiction arise as to suits filed in the
Supreme People's Court. Under the Civil Procedure Law, the
Supreme People's Court is the court of first instance for matters of
national significance and cases it "deems it should try." 10 3 The
ambiguity of this language indicates that there is much room for
discretion and political sway in whether the case is accepted by the
court.
In September 2001, before the tainted milk scandal, the
Supreme People's Court issued a notice that it would not accept
class actions, at least for the present time. This notice came in
response to a series of shareholder derivative suits. The Court
accepted such litigation only on the condition that the Securities
Regulatory Commission had made an administrative penalty
decision. 04 Thus, the highest court of the nation indicated that these
joint actions would not be heard until administrative remedies were
exhausted. Another obstacle to class actions in China is the weak
independence of the judiciary, which means that political pressure
on the courts not to accept such suits prevents well-deserving
plaintiffs from being heard.
In this way, class actions in China have had limited utility for
private litigants aside from the ability to announce their grievances
to the public and garner media attention, which serves indirectly to
pressure the government to take official action. At the same time,
class actions may be useful as a private enforcement mechanism that
fills in the gaps of China's food safety regulation and monitoring
system and allows plaintiffs to organize collectively. Increased
litigation and the threat of litigation alter the cost-benefit analysis of
manufacturers and distributors of food products and incentivize
them to exercise greater care in food safety. How the Supreme
People's Court will treat the class action in the present case is yet to
be seen. At this point, Sanlu is poised to become a landmark case
that may introduce new forces in litigation and alter the landscape
102. Id.
103. BROWN, supra note 52, at 54; see also Families Victimized in the Melamine
Scandal: Will You Ever Be Heard? CHINA BUSINESS LAW BLoG, Feb. 18, 2009,
http://chinabusinesslaw.blogspot.com/2009/02/families-victimized-in-melamine-
scandal.html.
104. Powerpoint presentation by Ruyin Hu, Class Action Practice in China, slide 9,
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/48/59/2484790.ppt.
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of the Chinese legal system forever.
D. Criminal Proceedings
While litigation is still a relatively new method of dispute
resolution in civil cases, criminal trials are quite common. In China,
99% of criminal cases result in conviction.105 Furthermore, the death
penalty is ever-present in China, a country known to carry out as
many as 8,000 executions per year.106 It is clear that the government
is more comfortable in the role of prosecutor, carrying out hard-
handed justice and cracking down on wrongdoers. However, when
official government actions are under question, the judiciary is
much more reluctant to intervene.
In the present case, Tian Wenhua, the former chairwoman of
Sanlu and CCP appointee, was arrested and tried in a Hebei court in
the first round of hearings. Tian pleaded guilty to selling tainted
formula, acknowledging for the first time that the company knew of
melamine in the milk for months before alerting local officials.107
She was fined $3 million and sentenced to life imprisonment. Tian
is one of the highest-ranking corporate executives ever to go on trial
in China.108 She has since appealed her sentence, announcing her
belief that she has been made a scapegoat. In an interview with a
London paper, her lawyer sharply criticized the Chinese authorities
and suggested that charges against Tian were designed to shield
local government officials from culpability.109 In March 2009, the
Hebei Higher People's Court affirmed the lower court's ruling,
rejecting Tian's appeal.110
The heaviest sentences were handed down to Zhang Yujin,
whom the government labeled one of the "principal criminals" in
the scandal, and dairy producer Geng Jinpin, who were both
sentenced to death."' Zhang sold 600 tons of melamine-laced
105. The People's Court, supra note 55.
106. Id.
107. Wong, supra note 88.
108. Id.
109. Malcolm Moore, Chinese Milk Executive Says She was Scapegoat for Crisis,
TELEGRAPH, Feb. 8, 2009, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/
china/4558457/Chinese-milk-executive-says-she-was-scapegoat-for-crisis.html.
110. China Court Upholds Death Sentences in Milk Scandal, XINHUA, Mar. 26, 2009,
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009-03/26/contentll1078553.htm.
111. David Barboza, Death Sentences in Chinese Milk Case, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 23,
2009, at A5, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/23/world/asia/
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protein powder to dairy companies. Two men who sold tainted
protein powder were also given life sentences.1 2 As victims'
families protested outside the courthouse in Shijiazhuang, one
parent of a child who had kidney stones after drinking tainted
formula commented that the defendants were scapegoats and that
the government should take responsibility." 3
The government's conduct in the criminal proceedings relating
to the Sanlu case reveals its desire to appear to the Chinese public
that it is taking a proactive stance on the matter. An attorney in a
Chinese law firm that was not involved in the case commented that
"after the government organized compensation and sentenced two
dairy company executives to death over the matter, 'they think
they've done what needs to be done." ' 114 However, incarcerating
corporate executives and executing melamine dealers does only so
much to mitigate the public's anger over the government's
involvement in the cover up. As victims' families demand greater
justice through the courts in the form of class actions or otherwise, it
will become increasingly difficult for the Chinese government to
deny them access.
On the one hand, the government's response to the tainted milk
issue was a manifestation of the available remedies within China's
legal system, and to a certain extent, one that was expected by the
plaintiffs (expressed in their statements indicating low expectation
of money damages from and inefficiencies of a lawsuit, even if
successful). On the other hand, plaintiffs found that their rights to
bring forward civil claims were denied by the courts due to so-
called preemption. Steve Dickinson views the government's
response to the Sanlu case and subsequent resolution through
criminal proceedings as "typically Chinese."" 5  According to
Dickinson, the predictable pattern was that: (a) Sanlu was forced
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compensation fund was established and managed by the
government; (c) individuals considered responsible were subject to
criminal sanctions; and (d) civil tort lawsuits against Sanlu were
"rejected on the ground that the public criminal and bankruptcy
proceedings preempted the private litigation process." 116
In particular, Dickinson noted the use of harsh criminal
sanctions against company executives for food safety violations as
peculiar to China and virtually nonexistent in the United States or
Europe. According to Dickinson, "private civil action is considered
inadequate" where a widespread public health hazard exists, and
that from the Chinese perspective, a public issue "requires a public
response."117 While this may be true as a matter of government
policy, Dickinson's view says nothing about the point of view of
individual plaintiffs, who seek redress for the harms suffered by
their children and who are enlisting the assistance of willing
attorneys to push the courts for a different kind of response. The
recent spate of individual civil suits brought by injured families
attests to a growing desire among Chinese plaintiffs to have their
day in court and to seek legal remedies when political action is
unresponsive or inadequate. In short, litigation will be increasingly
sought as a way for individuals to not only air their grievances, but
also assert their rights and obtain remedies in China's courts.
Further, the threat of liability in the form of massive money
damages will serve as a deterrent to companies that do not comply
with food and product safety regulations. It will also act as an
enforcement mechanism, and change the incentive structure for
government and corporate officials to act more in line with food
safety regulations instead of colluding to cover up negative
information, and to increase transparency in the system of food
safety administration overall. These are desirable considerations for
change in China's legal system. They will better balance the needs
of potential plaintiffs with those of the central government to more
effectively regulate food safety across the country and rein in






The Sanlu case reflects a shift in the Chinese legal system to one
that increasingly accepts and seeks civil dispute resolution through
the courts. While Chinese society is generally more familiar with
formal proceedings against criminal defendants prosecuted by the
government, this is true to a lesser extent in the context of civil
proceedings, such as tort actions brought by private parties.
Though China is far from becoming a highly litigious system like
the United States, the legal landscape is manifesting a greater
willingness of plaintiffs to push for judicial remedies, despite
uncertainty as to whether it will offer greater compensation for
harm suffered. In many ways, litigation presents a better avenue for
presenting and redressing plaintiffs' concerns in a public forum and
holding wrongdoers accountable in a way that changes their
behavior. The Sanlu case demonstrates the willingness of victims'
families and their attorneys to test the limits of the legal system. The
Chinese government will soon need to respond to the changing
demands of a society that is increasingly asserting their rights, and
to plaintiffs who are calling for their day in court.
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